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Why dowars last as long as they do?Why do some rage for years, while otherslast only a few months or days? The question matters because longer wars
have serious consequences. They produce more fatalities1 and are a greater threat to
regimes’ stability than are shorter wars.2 To cite but one prominent example, had
World War I ended in 1916, rather than dragging on into 1918, the German, Austro-
Hungarian, andRussian Empires would probably have survived, and the rise of both
communism and fascism would have been less likely. Thus, war duration can have
important implications that go beyond the immediate war in question.
Older research reasonably argued that less intense war fighting strategies and
rough terrain extend conflicts.3 Yet variation in war duration can be found even
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3. D. Scott Bennett and Allan C. Stam, “The Duration of Interstate Wars, 1816–1985,” Amer-
ican Political Science Review 90 (1996): 239–57. The relationship between the balance of forces and
war duration is less clear. This is because imbalance, which would seemingly shorten wars, can
cause the weaker side to pursue guerrilla strategies, thereby extending conflicts. Also, while the rel-
ative balance of forces should affect the terms of any settlement, rationalists suggest it is disagree-
ment about that balance rather than the balance itself that influences war duration. See James D.
Fearon, “Rationalist Explanations for War,” International Organization 49 (1995): 379–414;
Donald Wittman, “How aWar Ends: A Rational Model Approach,” Journal of Conflict Resolution
23 (1979): 743–63. Thus, it is difficult to draw any conclusions about the relationship between the
military balance and the likely duration of a war. Last, there is no consensus about whethermilitary
technology that favors offense should lead to longer or shorter wars, or even if it is possible to de-
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among wars of similar intensity and terrain.4 More recent research has turned to
looking at how states bargain with each other.What allows and prevents states from
reaching mutually acceptable bargains to halt the fighting? Do obstacles to peace
stem from parochial interests of leaders, psychological hurdles that prevent leaders
from recognizing or accepting defeat, entrapment dynamics of leaders beholden to
hawkish supporters, or the nature of the conflict itself? Such research has produced
answers stemming from the rationalist bargaining framework, domestic politics,
and psychology.
Rationalist approaches have looked to the causes of war to explain their duration.
With some exceptions, rationalists have argued that longer wars are likely to have
been caused by commitment problems, which arise when expected future shifts in
relative power make it impossible for states to credibily commit to agreements today,
since they would have strong incentives to renege and either violate or renegotiate the
agreement in the future.5 Rationalists believe that commitment problems are the bet-
ter explanation of long wars because private information about states’ current capa-
bilities and resolve is revealed reasonably quickly by battles and exchanges of offers
for settlement, often allowing states to reach a mutually acceptable settlement.6
Commitment problems, on the other hand, may take years to resolve because of
the need to significantly degrade an opponent’s power in order to prevent or offset
potential future power shifts or even bring about regime change in an opponent.
Domestic politics approaches have suggested that leaders may prolong wars due
to high personal stakes in or private benefits from the war7 or due to an inability to
4. Weisiger, Logics of War, 1–2 (see note 1 above).
5. Commitment problems arise when anticipated future power shifts create an incentive for
a party to an agreement to renege on that agreement when it has become more powerful. Com-
mitment problems can also arise if a given regime is seen as being dispositionally unable to honor
an agreement. These dynamics undermine states’ ability to reach agreements today as there is
little reason to expect the agreement to hold in the future. See Robert Powell, “War as a Commit-
ment Problem,” International Organization 60 (2006): 169–203.
6. Robert Powell, “Persistent Fighting and Shifting Power,” American Journal of Political
Science 56 (2012): 620–37; Dan Reiter, How Wars End (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University
Press, 2009); Weisiger, Logics of War (see note 1 above).
7. Sarah Croco, “The Decider’s Dilemma: Leader Culpability, War Outcomes, and Domestic
Punishment,” American Political Science Review 105 (2011): 457–77; Goemans, War and Pun-
termine whether technology favors offense. See Karen R. Adams, “Attack and Conquer? Interna-
tional Anarchy and the Offense-Defense-Deterrence Balance,” International Security 28 (2003–
04): 45–83; Stephen Biddle, “Rebuilding the Foundations of Offense-Defense Theory,” Journal
of Politics 63 (2001): 741–74; Marco Nilsson, “Offense-Defense Balance, War Duration, and the
Security Dilemma,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 56 (2012): 467–89; Branislav Slantchev, “How
Initiators End their Wars: The Duration of Warfare and the Terms of Peace,” American Journal
of Political Science 48 (2004): 813–29.
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construct a domestic governing coalition that could both accept a peace settlement
and remain in power.8 These studies vary in the relative importance they assign to
individual leaders versus the political regime as a whole, suggesting avenues for fur-
ther research.
Psychological approaches argue that it is ultimately difficult to view extremely
protracted and costly wars as the consequence of a rational decision-making pro-
cess. Scholars focusing on psychology have argued that cognitive biases, a focus on
sunk costs, or concerns about national honor may prevent settlement.9 They have
also found that emotions affect beliefs and decision making, which in turn can in-
fluence how states update their expectations for war and their willingness to accept
a proposed settlement.10
While each of these approaches has been productive, the disagreements across
and also within them are worth more attention. The aim of this symposium is to
create a dialogue between scholars from these varying approaches. The hope is that
such a conversation will not only help to clarify disagreements and to determine
which factors are most important, but also to find areas of agreement and perhaps
of synergy.
Indeed, recent years have seen some attempts to find a productive synthesis be-
tween rationalist and psychological approaches. For example, Streich and Levy ex-
amine how motivated and unmotivated biases influence the role of information
asymmetries in causing war.11 In particular, they demonstrate that Russian racial
biases and a focus on the most optimistic intelligence reports, combined with sig-
nificant uncertainty about the relative capabilities of Russia and Japan, ledMoscow
to already favor war in 1904—even though waiting would have been rational, since
Russian military strength in the Far East would continue to grow as construction
8. Stanley, Paths to Peace (see previous note).
9. Thomas M. Dolan, “Demanding the Impossible: Honor, Bargaining, and War,” Security
Studies 24 (2015): 528–62; Dominic Johnson, Overconfidence and War: The Havoc and Glory of
Positive Illusions (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2004); Alexander Lanoszka and
Michael A. Hunzeker, “Rage of Honor: Entente Indignation and the Lost Chance for Peace in
the First World War,” Security Studies 24 (2015): 662–95; Stanley, Paths to Peace (see note 7
above).
10. Thomas M. Dolan, “Go Big or Go Home? Positive Emotions and Responses to Wartime
Success,” International Studies Quarterly 60 (2016): 230–42.
11. Philip Streich and Jack S. Levy, “Information, Commitment, and the Russo-Japanese
War of 1904–1905,” Foreign Policy Analysis 12 (2016): 489–511.
ishment (see note 1 above); Sara McLaughlin Mitchell and Brandon C. Prins, “Rivalry and Di-
versionary Uses of Force,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 48 (2004): 937–61; Elizabeth A. Stan-
ley, Paths to Peace: Domestic Coalition Shifts, War Termination and the Korean War (Palo Alto,
Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2009).
164 | Introduction: The Puzzle of War Duration
This content downloaded from 146.096.128.036 on August 24, 2018 06:35:44 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
of the Trans-Siberian Railway continued over the next decade. Likewise, Lake
shows that while the rationalist framework is helpful for understanding interac-
tions between the United States and Iraq leading up to their 2003 war, the role that
information asymmetries and commitment problems played in causing the war
cannot be fully understood without factoring in American and Iraqi biases,
misperceptions, and domestic politics.12 Finally, a recent special issue of Interna-
tional Organization focuses on the implications of the behavioral revolution for
understanding international relations and whether new psychological insights
about how actors assess risks, make inter-temporal tradeoffs, and update beliefs
could be productively combined with rationalist approaches. In particular, it appears
that these new insights, including the possibility of social preferences and the connec-
tions between intuitions, emotions, and reasoning, might help us to understand ac-
tors’ beliefs, preferences, resolve, and preferred strategies.13 While the jury is still
out on whether such a fusion between rationalist and psychological approaches can
be successfully forged, it is clear that the disagreements and possible syntheses be-
tween rational and psychological approaches comprise an important and fertile area
of research worthy of further exploration.
With this goal in mind, the contributors to this symposium represent a variety
of approaches to explaining, and arguments about, war duration. First, Dan Reiter
argues that it is vital to think of war onset andwar duration as one process, since the
overlap between the two phenomena is evident in extant research. Specifically, the-
ories of war duration often build directly upon theories of war initiation. He argues
that this overlap can be leveraged to allow for better testing of theories and im-
proved theory construction.14
Second, Elizabeth Stanley builds on recent research in neuroscience, psychology,
and stress physiology to develop the micro-foundations of decision making un-
der stress. She then connects these insights to bargaining, domestic politics, and
12. David A. Lake, “Two Cheers for Bargaining Theory: Assessing Rationalist Explanations
of the Iraq War,” International Security 35 (Winter 2010–11): 7–52.
13. See especially: Emilie M. Hafner-Burton et al., “The Behavioral Revolution and Interna-
tional Relations,” International Organization 71 (2017): S1–S31; Brian C. Rathbun, Joshua D.
Kertzer, and Mark Paradis, “Homo Diplomaticus: Mixed-Method Evidence of Variation in Strate-
gic Rationality,” International Organization 71 (2017): S33–S60; JoshuaD.Kertzer, “Resolve, Time,
and Risk,” International Organization 71 (2017): S109–S136; Janice Gross Stein, “The Micro-
Foundations of International Relations Theory: Psychology and Behavioral Economics,” Interna-
tional Organization 71 (2017): S249–S263; Robert Powell, “Research Bets and Behavioral IR,” In-
ternational Organization 71 (2017): S265–S277.
14. Dan Reiter, “Unifying the Study of the Causes and Duration of Wars,” Polity 50 (2018):
168–77.
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psychological theories of war duration so as to better ground these frameworks in
human behavior and analyze their contributions to the literature. In particular, she
argues that the decline of leaders’ cognitive capacity, tolerance of ambiguity, and
ability to incorporate new information due to prolonged stress can help explain
why when wars last longer, it becomes more diffficult to end them.15
Third, Thomas Dolan notes that by focusing on perceptual biases and the cog-
nitive obstacles to learning and decisionmaking, psychological theories of war have
been limited to explaining long wars, though they can also help to explain short
wars. Dolan contends that psychological theories that address emotions, individual
traits, and decision making can and should be able to explain when leaders’ risk
acceptance, belief structures, and responsiveness to events make short wars more
likely. He concludes that creating psychological explanations of short wars will
make psychological approaches more complete and better position them to com-
pete with rationalist explanations of war.16
Fourth, AlexWeisiger argues that rationalist explanations of long wars are more
compelling than psychological explanations, since the latter often are empirically
intractable, cannot explain short wars, or largely mirror the predictions of rational-
ist explanations. He argues that as long as rationalist arguments can be seen as rea-
sonable approximations of reality, their simplicity will make them more appealing
as explanations of war duration than psychological interpretations are.17
In the next article of the symposium, I argue that testing competing theories of
long wars is extremely difficult. To some extent, this is a result of definitional and
scope issues that are inherent in the study of war duration.More problematic, how-
ever, is that many theories of war duration predict similar behaviors and that both
leadership groups and individual leaders often have multiple reasons for favoring
continued fighting. This combination of overlapping predicitons and multicausal-
ity makes testing theories of war duration very difficult.18
Weisiger concludes the symposium by highlighting points of agreement and dis-
agreement between the various contributors and identifying open questions. He fo-
cuses especially on the connections between war initiation and decisions to continue
15. Elizabeth A. Stanley, “War Duration and the Micro-Dynamics of Decision Making un-
der Stress,” Polity 50 (2018): 178–200.
16. Thomas M. Dolan, “Moving Beyond Pathology: Why Psychologists Should Care About
Short Wars,” Polity 50 (2018): 210–14.
17. Alex Weisiger, “Rationality and the Limits of Psychology in Explaining Interstate War
Duration,” Polity 50 (20180): 215–24.
18. Zachary C. Shirkey, “Rationality and the Limits of Psychology in Explaining Interstate
War Duration,” Polity 50 (2018): 225–37.
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fighting, the causes of short wars, and the need to adjudicate between competing ex-
planations of war duration.19
Given the continued occurrence of wars, both long and short, understanding
what causes them to vary in duration remains relevant. I hope that this sympo-
sium will not only help to clarify points of agreement and disagreement between
various explanations of war duration, but will also spur further and improved re-
search that may help those grappling with removing obstacles to war termination
and settlement.
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19. Alex Weisiger, “Conclusion,” Polity 50 (2018): 238–42.
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